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Empire (Princeton 1990). Op uitnodiging van het Interdisciplinair Vroegchristelijk 
Dispuut Agape nam MacMullen deel aan het Symposium 'Power and Possession. 
State, Society, and Chureh in the fourth century A .D . ' . 
You seem to have a liking for asking new and unexpected questions and refrain 
from joining conventional historiographical debates. With one exception (Part 2 
of Paganism), you're not in the habit of citing works 'only to disagree'. 
I do not like using my energy to wrestle with other scholars, I would niuch rather corne 
to grips with long dead people, and understand them if I can. That means that thoseparts 
of history that have been studied again and again and again as for example the 
Peloponnesian War don't attract me because you cannot come to grips with them, 
except in the marnier of my friend and colleague Donald Kagan who takes a very füll 
account of the modern scholarship and works away with that.1 Instead I go to those 
parts of Roman histoiy where the questions you can reasonably ask are not quite so 
strongly fought over. 
What strikes me is that you use niuch material from other disciplines, but when 
it cornes to explanations, you end up saying 'I leave that to experts'. Isn't that an 
easy way out? For example, you have written much about the rise of Christianity, 
but not about the church. 
I shied away from church history because that, like, for example, Roman law, is the 
preserve of fulltime experts, and you really shouldn ' t venture into their territory unless 
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you have a great deal of daring, or expertise. When I wrote the 'Christianizing' book 
I chose quite a narrow view to write about because I thought I could see a need to 
explain the subject. I must admit also to a considerable daring or rashness. I am not a 
church historian, and I really don't belong among the fulltime proper experts of that 
subject. I don't like to say things in print that I have no right to say, because of a lack 
of information. So I have avoided all or most of the most obvious questions that people 
rightly study in regard to the rise of Christianity: all the internal matters, how the church 
shaped itself, what its institutions were and that son of thing. It's not because I don't 
think all of this is unimportant, but I can' t find a place to make a contribution that might 
succeed. 
Occasionally I have made my bow to the importance of the internal condition of 
the Christian community. In a piece that I wrote recently at the tail end of my book 
Changes in the Román Empire I have gone into the processes by which the church 
made decisions by itself.2 There I looked into internal church history a certain amount. 
I think there is agreat deal more to be said on that subject, by people adequately trained, 
trying to look at the details of who is involved and how they behaved before looking 
at the outcome of the power-struggles or disagreements about the course-setting for the 
church: where it should go, what its dogma should be, what its practices should be. 
You don't seem to like models or broad theories very much. Instead you rely on 
sources. Do you think models and theories stand in the way of a correct 
interpretation of the sources? 
They don't interest me very much, because, when you have a model or theory, if you 
want to find out its valué, you have to prove it by dropping down to reality. And then 
I suppose you check it out, and raise it back up to the theoretical level. Well, if you have 
to do that, it seems a sort of needless operation for the discovery of the truth. Why not 
begin and end with reality and have done with it? 
Then what in your view is the function of historiography? 
I suppose it will be an answer that no one will take seriously, or perhaps they'll take 
it seriously and be quite irritated by it, but I think the function of historiography is very 
much like the function of chamber music. It provides a delightful diversión of fairly 
well-trained, fairly well-educated human tastes and impulses and, like chamber music 
and some of the other liberal arts, it has its rules and its practitioners and therefore it 
is judged to be good or bad, whether it provides the diversión people are looking for. 
I don' t think that historiography pro vides maps by which people can understand where 
to walk tomonow. I don't believe any professional historian is under that illusion, 
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either. When I hear people say that history maners, of course I agree. That is, people 
today or at any given moment act in part because of what they think happened in the 
past. But the sense of the past is quite different from historiography. That sense is 
lodgedinpeople's minds. It is important for them to talkabout it and understandit, they 
act accordingly. Their perceptions have historical significance in themselves, but they 
are not historiography and whether historiography can correct those impressions and 
perceptions so as to become histoiy itself, to make people act differently, I am quite 
sceptical. 
Historiography is an entertainment, I have an idea that tastes and therefore the 
perception of truth will change from time to time, and that there is nothing I have 
written, no truth I think I have arrived at, which is going to be around unmodifïed 
terribly long. Other people will ask more intelligent and more insightful questions. If 
I end up as you find me in a soit of apologetic farewell to a reader, it is with that sense 
of the change of views that I say what I do. 
You rely very much on your sources. But aren't they 'polluted' by ideology? 
Should not first the discourse be subjected to analysis, as Averil Cameron (among 
others) pleads?3 
I am as naïve on that question as you could ask, so I can't give you an impressive 
answer. I listen to what people say in public, which is of course virtually all of our 
surviving sources, in words anyway. I discount some because of the possibility of 
striking postures, assuming poses of a conventional soit which we do today on 
tombstones or in commencement-addresses and so forth; and if that kind of posturing 
is the point of your question, that people in making such public statements have to be 
discounted heavily because they are using traditional forms of speech, I think that's 
true. On the other hand, it has to be said that public speech is almost always designed 
to make people like you and should therefore be generally taken as the reflection of the 
views that could be expressed because they were common and liked and representative 
of prevailing norms. 
But you dismiss the literature of the Roman elite, because it shows values that 
aren't necessarily the values of the masses. Does the ideology of the elite not 
provide a model for the masses? 
Yes, that' s perfectly fair, and the degree of its fairness is a thing which I am sure should 
be checked out, and I would really like to see, and can easily see, a lot of work being 
done todetermine how much the elite were listened to and how little they were distorted 
when they were heard. The question of what happened to the views and opinions and 
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val ues of the well-to-do who were in charge of society, who funded, who occupied high 
offices, who were looked to for examples - the relation of that stratum of society with 
the rest of the community - surely isn't something similar to a carbon-copy or a xerox. 
There is surely distortion of what gets down to be imitated and that process I think needs 
to be studied so as to evaluate the important question you are asking, that is, how much 
the leadership are an effectual model as well as one simply present to be imitated if 
anyone wanted to imitate them. 
And do you think your work provides the beginning of the answers to that 
question? 
The only time I looked at the matter of the relationship between the response of the 
community at large and the declarations of the elite is in a little study I did of the fourth-
century preachers, both Greek and Latin, and the kind of audience they addressed for 
their sermons; and it occurred to me that that audience could be described socio-
economically to some degree and therefore you began to have some sense of who was 
listening to the elite.4 But I have never investigated whether after listening they went 
out and did what they were told, if they went out and imitated their models. Whether 
there is work of that soit done by other people, ï am not sure. There might be some, for 
example, comparing Cicero's speeches with subsequent political action, where you 
have a fairly good control of what is said and then subsequently what is done. It is a 
very difficult question, though. 
In much of your work the notion is discernible that the Romanization left many 
in the provinces untouched. When Roman power receded, much provinciai 
feeling, most notably detectable in the rise of provinciai languages, came to the 
foreground. Do you regard this as a process of both democratization and the 
falling apart of some centrally shared notions?' In Paganism you write (in reply 
to the objections of Peter Brown): for the moment, we must be content with 
conventionally documented interpretations'.6 Do you still hold this view? 
This takes us to the heart of the matter you raised earlier. That is, how much did the 
upper pan of civilization communicate itself to the mass of ci vilization. I have al ways 
been interested in the degree to which people do not do what they're supposed to do, 
since I have a sentimental attachment to freedom, and the powerless can only express 
their freedom by a kind of passive disobedience, going their own way rather than 
confronting authority. Well, that sentimental attachment made me look with special 
interest at the degree to which the non-elite remained themselves, and had their own 
way of life. I am struck by that whole broad phenomenon that carries through the 
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Middle Ages and to at least the nineteenth century: for example the degree to which 
pagan alternatives to canonical Christian religion maintained themselves and asserted 
themselves. I am interested in the unwillingness of a lot of people who had no power 
to conform in language, in the motives in their ait et cetera. I think since élite 
civilization is so much easier to approach, and has so much more stylish attractiveness, 
it tends to get ail the news, while the other part is for that very same reason attractive, 
because there is not so much written about it and there are opportunities there. 
But would you still describe this rise of provincial feeling as a form of 
'democratization'? 
Well, that implies a sort of consciousness of it. I certainly don't think that if you could 
attend some meeting of farmers after harvest, getting drunk on the threshing-floor, 
when ail their work was done, you would hear them talking révolution, certainly not. 
Sothey weren'taimingat democratization. Theirnon-compliance withelitecivilization 
might in a theoretical way be seen as aforce defending the différence of the demos, yes, 
but that's a little theoretical I think. 
The same applies to the notion of nationalism, I suppose? 
Yes, well in the conventional sensé of that word it implies what modem historians 
any way would call a nineteenth-century invention of the West. Nationalism is such a 
complicated word, and brings with it so much history, it is probably best left out. In the 
conventional sensé, I don't think you can find nationalism in Antiquity. 
So by now you wouldn't apply the word nationalism to Egypt in Late Antiquity, 
as you once did in the sixties?7 
Correct, I wouldn't use the word for Egypt. There was an assertion, or at least a 
stubborn rétention, of cultural différences inside Egypt, but the Copts, the mass of the 
Egyptian people i n the Nile-val ley, didn ' t arm themselves, and go out and beat up other 
people; so that half, the political half of what usually is meant by nationalism, was 
absent. A long time ago, I was really caught by William Frend's book on the Donatist 
Church, which attracted a lot of interest, had a great style, and I thought was very 
stimulating.8 So it may have been under the spell of that book, which I ended up 
disagreeing with, that I began looking around elsewhere in the Roman Empire to pick 
up the same phenomena that he was looking for. Perhaps I thought I might find better 
instances. It is a terrible fate to have written things that you've forgotten about. 
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You seem to aim at broad statements about the feelings that govern peoples' lives. 
So, much of your work is descriptive and off ers no special thesis. Do you think that 
a description of the 'histoire de la longue durée' gives a sufficiënt explanation in 
itself? 
I am not quite sure of the question because you would have to say, 'Sufficiënt 
explanation of what?' I think when you want to satisfy yourself, when you want to 
understand why a group of people in the past did what they did - they went to war, or 
they changed the manner of building their houses, or whatever it may be - you 
encounter those people in the grip of a number of different impulses, which are very 
much like radio waves depending on whether they have a short 'durée' or a long. That 
is, for instance, in the building of a house, the short 'durée', has to do with economie 
matters, whether individuals have money or not, and the long 'durée' has to do with 
whether they want to imitate classical models or do something more adventuresome 
or more of the time; and in order to understand the event you're studying you have to 
look at it, dropping your gaze from one layer to another to another. I think the reason 
people look at the long 'durée' in recent times is because in the nature of things it is 
the most difficult to get at. It has been the longest disregarded, because of its difficulty 
and therefore it has the kind of novelty and adventure about it that histoiy writers like. 
I like it because of its intellectual challenge. It involves you in very difficult and 
intriguing and very powerful questions about motive. Finally, it gets to a level of 
affective history, history of how people feel about things, which seems to me the 
bedrock of explanation. When you get there, and know feelings not thoughts, you are 
coming close to a grip on people. 
So we have to move on to psychological explanations? 
Yes. I did a pièce for Pastand Present in 1980,9 which I was really pleased with, trying 
to present the case for the importance of bringing one' s own human empathy to bear 
on the problem of historical understanding. What I was suggesting there, is that 
historians don' t want to do a lot of their understanding with their émotions, rather than 
with their logical capacities, because in the transmission of their material to them the 
emotive tends to have dropped out of the written record - it is not so easily explained 
by one génération to another or even by one participant in history to his contemporaries. 
Therefore historical explanation is constantly overwhelmed by logical descriptions 
particularly those offering material benefit as the explanatory motive, where in fact 
people, as I see it, are very emotional créatures: they go to war because they're angry 
or they buy a house because they're jealous of someone who has a bigger one. They 
spent money in San Gimignano for example, building ridiculous architectural 
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monstrosities for reasons of passion, a rather petty passion too. If you could ask them 
why did they do that, they would give a logical answer, but it would not be the truth. 
So when you come to examine the Iandscape of San Gimignano, or the French 
Revolution, or whatever it be, I think your understanding to be correct must bring the 
whole of you to bear, meaning all your feelings. 
You wrote several times that change is what history shouid be about. The title of 
your collection of essays is Changes in the Roman Empire. But in much of your 
ovvn work you're not much concerned with change. When I read your book on 
curruption it strikes me that in its two main chapters (two and three) you describe 
two stationary situations, one in which the system works, and another one in 
which it no longer works. The change in between is left out 
It is true. It may be a little bit because the easy part of history, the part that first attracts 
interest and is what children for example enjoy about history, is the Störy, which 
ventures into political histoiy, which then may get into military history, history of 
public institutions and so on, and all of that has been done so much. If you want to avoid 
competing withpast historians who probably know a lot more than you do (as I am sure 
is what is true of Mommsen and half a hundred of modern historians), you're better off 
avoiding that level of combat and making your escape to something beneath the 
political and the economic to other parts that haven't been explored quite so much. 
Who would have the courage to write about the public life of Cicero now? - Which 
would involve you in warf are with half a hundred of ghosts, not to mention all the living 
people who make their profession out of that? So, it is better to go elsewhere. 
You wrote a book on corruption and the décline of Rome. The conclusion of the 
survey was that there was great regional variety in Late Antique conditions, 
which made it impossible to speak of an overall 'décline'. Yet, in the end you do 
assume a décline in the West; the Western Roman Empire did fall, after all. The 
explanation you offer is corruption. Now shouid we conclude that there was less 
corruption in, let's say North Africa, or, in the East? 
I never bothered, and when I look back it was rather silly, to use that 'Corruption' book 
as a way of expiai ni ng 'the décline of Rome'. What I was aiming to do was to add to 
the discussion an element that hadn't been looked at carefully. If I had wanted to be 
more ambitious, I would have involved myself in explaining the différence in fate 
between the Eastern and the Western Empire. That would have drawn me into a long 
discussion which I think is quite easy to do, but long, regarding the territorial threats 
on the East and the West. Of course the empire in North Africa is not going to collapse, 
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because its external enemies have no power-base to the south, so that is no problem. 
They are only semi-nomads. Of course in the West, likewise, there is no collapse in 
Spain for example, because there are no enemies out there. It is a little paradoxical to 
say that there were no serious enemies on the east, but, I think you could make a 
convincing case for the Eastern Empire enjoying a necessary stand-off without 
décisive victory either way between the Empire of the Romans and the Empire of the 
Sassanids, the Persians, because of the logistical problems involved in the territory 
between them. And if one looks at the whole very long history of Roman and Eastern 
relations, one can see that the Eastern powers for reasons of supply and massing of 
military thrust simply cannot get into the Empire and stay there for a length of time. 
That leaves the fourth frontier which is to the north; and the attack there which 
happened to come along the Rhine and Upper-Danube explains the différences 
between the ultimate fate over centuries of the Eastern and Western Empire. If by 
accident there had been a similar massing of raiders, big raiding tribes in the Caucasus 
for example, things would have been different, but that is not the way it happened. 
So corruption is not the explanation for the décline, and we should return to 
military history? 
CoiTuption is an explanation for the weakness of the military forces and the weakness 
of the supporting economy in the cities; and in those regards corruption is a big thing. 
It counts for a lot and can be found throughout the empire. But the challenge to the 
military and economie structures of the empire happened to come from certain 
geographical directions and not from others and therein lies the link between 
corruption and ultimately the shape of changes in the fifth-sixth centuries. 
I guess the best thing is to leave it to the argument case by case which I tried to 
present in the last chapter of that Corruption-book. It is a free country. Either readers 
will believe those cases or they won't. I have had my chance to persuade them. 
Some other critics point to the similarity between your thesis about corruption 
and the old thesis about the décadence of the aristocracy. Is there indeed a relation 
between them? They think it is an old-fashioned explanation of course. 
Yes, of course, the word décadence reeks of a kind of nineteenth-century dismissive 
moralising stupidity, and it is not scientific. Therefore, we cannot talk about that. There 
is a good deal of historiographical embarrassment about discussing values, and 
therefore a good deal of conscious invention of sociological terms to make them all 
appear tidier, more up to date and intellectually respectable. Who, for instance, would 
be willing to write a book called The history ofniorals, as Lecky did a long time ago?'° 
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It would excite sneers and disbelief. But the fact is, when you get away from the old-
fashioned terminology toward more neutral terms, people do have codes of behaviour 
which are determined by the culture around them. They do modify their daily actions 
to some degree, more or less, in terms of those codes, those norms, and therefore to 
study those norms, whether you cali them moráis or whatever, helps a historian very 
much.11 
At the end of the book you make some remarks about contemporary corruption 
in your own country. Some people think the significance you attach to corruption 
is too much influenced by your own worries about the contemporary state of 
affairs in the US. 
Well, it is true that I was passionately at odds with the Republican party in my country, 
and still am. But on the other hand, if one looks at India in the last ten years - if one reads 
the New Delhi Times as I have done very seriously as a matter to inform myself - one 
sees good observers of their own country attaching a lot of historical significance to 
habits in the tenure of public office, and, more recently, if one looks to Italy, one can 
see serious Italians saying seriously that the reason for their country's falling behind 
other countries, in the post-War world, economically, is most easily explained by the 
quantum of Gross National Product subtracted from useful effort by the habits of 
public and prívate corruption. So, the question that you ask, if I understand it, is the 
matter of historical significance: Can corruption be worth looking at? I think the 
answer is yes; one can look around in the modern world, and find a certain amount in 
the US and various other examples which are quite clear. 
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